The International Energy Agency’s 2026 outlook reports that, excluding rare earths, the average share of the leading refining country reached 72% in 2025, versus 70% in 2023. It also says the number of mineral tariff codes covered by Chinese export controls has tripled since 2023. These are report-period observations, not a fresh October shipment count.
Opinion: abundance is answering the wrong question
A buyer can struggle to obtain usable material even when producers supply enough globally. We would ask which alternative suppliers could deliver if its usual refinery became unavailable.
A government funding another mine may achieve little diversification if the operator must send its output to the same constrained refinery. An operator building another refinery also needs reliable feedstock, acceptable recoveries and customers willing to qualify its product.
We would judge a diversification programme by the deliveries its operators can sustain, rather than by the number of mines announced.
A better scorecard for public money
Our proposed scorecard would track four things: dependable feedstock, demonstrated processing, customer acceptance, and a viable financing plan. Each should have dates and milestones. Announced capacity should remain separate from commissioned capacity and sustained production.
We would also ask where the chain can fail. Does a new plant still depend on one overseas reagent supplier? Does its financing rely on a subsidy that has only been proposed? Does its customer agreement require qualification that has not occurred? Policymakers need to examine those dependencies when assessing a project’s security value.
For policymakers, our opinion is that support should purchase measurable resilience. Payments linked to independently checked operating milestones would be easier to defend than a cheque justified by an impressive resource number alone.
The honest objection: diversification can be expensive
Customers may pay more to buy through a diversified route than from an established producer. Governments may also fund capacity that customers would otherwise have no reason to use. The security argument must state what disruption it insures against and why the additional cost is justified.
If customers will not pay a premium, policymakers should be explicit about who pays it and for how long. Without that explanation, a government could support a project whose customers cannot afford its product.
There is also a risk of overbuilding the wrong stage. We would rather see a smaller functioning chain with proven customers than a larger collection of disconnected announcements. We are expressing a preference, not forecasting failure at a named project.
What would change our view?
We would become less concerned if alternative routes demonstrated sustained deliveries and commercially durable demand. We would become more concerned if project announcements multiplied while the actual points of dependence stayed the same.
The Take: We would judge mineral security by whether buyers can obtain qualified material from alternative suppliers. Policymakers should track sustained deliveries and the cost of maintaining those alternatives.
Opinion and analysis, as of 9 October 2026.
Style update, 11 October 2026: wording revised; sourced figures, publication date and substantive qualifications retained.